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SHOULD NONCOMMERCIAL  
ASSOCIATIONS HAVE AN ABSOLUTE  
RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE? 
ANDREW KOPPELMAN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,1 the Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts of 
America had the right to discriminate against gay people.  The Court’s opinion is so 
muddled that it is hard to know who, other than the Scouts themselves, will benefit 
from it.  A growing number of prominent scholars have suggested a clarification: that 
noncommercial private associations should be given an absolute right to discriminate.  
This clarification should be resisted. 
Before Dale, American constitutional law’s treatment of freedom of association 
followed what Dale Carpenter calls a “message-based approach”:2  if an association is 
organized to express a viewpoint, then constitutional difficulties are raised by a statute 
that requires it to accept unwanted members if that requirement would impair its abil-
ity to convey its message.  This rule has become unclear because Dale introduced two 
ambiguities into the law.  First, it seemed to hold that substantial interference would 
be found whenever an organization complained.  Second, it seemed to hold that sub-
stantial burdens were per se unconstitutional, rather than merely subject to strict scru-
tiny.  In effect, any plaintiff’s claim was so powerful that all antidiscrimination laws 
were unconstitutional in all their applications.  However, this rule is so patently silly 
that the lower federal courts have refused to believe it and have rejected Dale claims 
so consistently that they are on their way to confining Dale to its facts.  The message-
based approach lives. 
A notable group of commentators, whom I shall call the “neolibertarians,”3 have 
responded to Dale’s ambiguity by advocating a sharper rule than any declared in the 
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 1. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 2. Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law after Dale: A Tripartite Ap-
proach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1517 (2001). 
 3. The restriction of the right to noncommercial associations is what makes them “neo.” 
03_KOPPELMAN_FMT.DOC 2/16/2005  9:32 AM 
28 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 67:27 
Dale opinion: an absolute right of noncommercial associations to exclude unwanted 
members. The group is a distinguished one, including Judge Michael McConnell and 
Professors David Bernstein, Dale Carpenter, Richard Epstein, John McGinnis, Mi-
chael Paulsen, and Nancy Rosenblum.  Their approach promises “to draw a line be-
tween [freedom of association and antidiscrimination law] that will preserve a large 
realm for group expression and organization while allowing the state to promote its 
equality objectives in the most compelling contexts.”4  A message-based approach, the 
neolibertarians argue, gives government the opportunity to scrutinize and reshape pri-
vate speech, and thereby violates the central purposes of the First Amendment.  One 
illustration of the pathology of a message-based approach, emphasized by several of 
these writers and by the Dale Court as well, is that it produces perverse results: a 
group that is stridently prejudiced will receive more protection than one that is quieter 
about its views, and thus the rule creates an incentive to disseminate the very preju-
dices that antidiscrimination laws aim to temper. 
What the neolibertarians describe as perverse effects of a message-based approach 
are actually desirable ones.  The pressure that a message-based approach brings to 
bear on discriminatory associations is exactly the kind of result that antidiscrimination 
law should strive to bring about, and it reaches it in a way that gives freedom of 
speech all the respect that it deserves.  A message-based approach does put some pres-
sure on discriminatory associations: discrimination is not so cheap as it was before, 
and a group will have to decide whether discrimination is worth the added cost.  But 
this pressure serves state interests of the highest order and does not prevent groups 
with strongly held discriminatory ideas from uniting and disseminating them. 
The neolibertarian arguments are only slightly modified versions of old, discred-
ited libertarian objections to the existence of any antidiscrimination law at all.  The 
older, minimal-state libertarianism rests on three premises: (1) a more-than-minimal 
state violates citizens’ rights (the Rights premise), (2) government cannot be trusted to 
do more than prevent force and fraud (the Distrust premise), and (3) an unregulated 
private sector can be relied on to produce benign results (the Optimism premise).  
Libertarianism has failed as a normative theory because all three premises are often 
false.  The neolibertarian modification is to confine application of all three premises 
only to noncommercial associations.  But even thus restricted in scope, there is no rea-
son to think that any of them is true as a general matter. 
Part II of this article describes the confusion of the Dale opinion and what lower 
courts have made of it.  Part III surveys the arguments of the neolibertarians and 
shows that their arguments are slightly modified versions of the old libertarian objec-
tions to antidiscrimination legislation of any kind.  Part IV examines the state interests 
that would be sacrificed by the neolibertarian rule, with special attention to the case of 
the Boy Scouts.  I argue that discrimination by noncommercial associations can inflict 
considerable harms, and that the application of antidiscrimination norms to private as-
sociations may reflect members’ preferences better than one in which there is an unre-
stricted freedom to discriminate.  Part V considers what would be the optimal rule of 
 
 4. Id. 
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law, given these conflicting interests.  Distrust of judicial decisionmakers does not 
necessarily produce absolute protection of rights; it can lead the Court to withdraw 
protection, as it did in Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith.5  Compared to the ri-
gidities of either absolute protection or no protection, the ambiguous protection of the 
message-based approach, which predated and largely survives Dale, is the wisest rule 
after all. 
II 
THE CONFUSION OF DALE 
The leading case before Dale that addressed the right to exclude was Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees,6 in which the Court held that a state could constitutionally re-
quire an all-male association of young businessmen to admit women.  The Court’s 
opinion observed that the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment is 
often exercised collectively, and so entails a certain degree of freedom of association.  
This liberty in turn entails a right to exclude unwanted members: 
There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an as-
sociation than a regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not desire. Such a 
regulation may impair the ability of the original members to express only those views that 
brought them together. Freedom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not 
to associate.7 
The Court limited the right it thus created, holding that infringements upon the 
right to exclude could be justified by “compelling state interests, unrelated to the sup-
pression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive 
of associational freedoms.”8  The result was a balancing test: antidiscrimination norms 
could legitimately be imposed on associations if the state interest was great enough.  
In practice, free association claims unrelated to viewpoint discrimination lost in the 
Supreme Court.9 
Then came Dale.  The Dale case involved a New Jersey statute that prohibited 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  The Scouts revoked James Dale’s 
membership after a newspaper story (which did not mention his affiliation with the 
Scouts) identified him as an officer of his college’s lesbian and gay student organiza-
tion.  Dale successfully sued under the statute.  The Boy Scouts of America claimed 
that the application of the law to them would violate their freedom of expression, but 
the New Jersey Supreme Court, applying the Roberts test, was “not persuaded . . . that 
a ‘shared goal’ of Boy Scout members is to associate in order to preserve the view that 
 
 5. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause was inapplicable because the state law was 
one of general, neutral applicability). 
 6. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 7. Id. at 623. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); N.Y. State Club 
Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).  On the other hand, there is enough ambiguity in the language of 
these decisions that Michael Paulsen is able plausibly to describe them as rare exceptions to a general rule of 
freedom of association.  See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and Schools, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1917, 
1924-28 (2001). 
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homosexuality is immoral.”10  The Court noted that the Scouts had not, in their public 
materials, taken any position whatsoever concerning the morality of homosexuality.  It 
therefore held “that Dale’s membership does not violate Boy Scouts’ right of expres-
sive association because his inclusion would not ‘affect in any significant way [Boy 
Scouts’] existing members’ ability to carry out [“those activities.”]’”11 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.  It used the following reasoning:  
(1) The Scouts are an association that “engages in expressive activity”12 protected 
by the First Amendment.   
(2) Forced inclusion of a member therefore violates the First Amendment if it 
“would significantly affect the Boy Scouts’ ability to advocate public or private view-
points.”13   
(3) The Boy Scouts assert that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values 
embodied in the Scout Oath and Law, particularly those represented by the require-
ment that Scouts be “morally straight” and “clean.”14   
(4) The Court must give deference to an organization’s assertions regarding the 
nature of its expression.   
(5) The  Court “must also give deference to an association’s view of what would 
impair its expression.”15   
(6) The Court should prevent forced association: “Dale’s presence in the Boy 
Scouts would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the 
youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a 
legitimate form of behavior.”16 
The opinion in Dale does not state a clear rule to guide lower courts, but it implies 
either that all antidiscrimination laws are unconstitutional in all their applications or 
that citizens are allowed to disobey laws whenever obedience would be perceived as 
endorsing some message.  The first rule is supported by propositions (1) through (5) 
above, which together permit any defendant to allege a message to which courts must 
defer.  The second rule is supported by proposition (6), together with the Court’s in-
vocation of the rule against compelled speech.17 
Cases after Dale have revealed its potentially broad implications and lower courts’ 
reluctance to follow out those implications.  Courts have rejected Dale–based chal-
 
 10. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 734 A.2d 1196, 1223-24 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoted 
in Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647. 
 11. 734 A.2d at 1225, quoted in Dale, 530 U.S. at 647 (quoting Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 548). 
 12. Dale, 530 U.S. at 650. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 653. 
 16. Id. 
 17. This analysis of the Court’s opinion is developed in detail in Andrew Koppelman, Signs of the Times: 
Dale v. Boy Scouts of America and the Changing Meaning of Nondiscrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819 
(2002).  That essay critiques the work product of the Court, but does not deal with the deeper question, ad-
dressed by the present essay, of what constitutional protection ought to be given to freedom of association.  For 
a more detailed analysis of the doctrinal confusion introduced by Dale, see David McGowan, Making Sense of 
Dale, 18 CONST. COMMENT 121 (2001). 
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lenges to a city ordinance prohibiting commercial sex clubs,18 a gun control statute 
limiting the use of certain weapons to licensed gun clubs (effectively pressuring non-
members to join such clubs),19 the use of undercover officers to enforce a prohibition 
of “lap dancing,”20 a statute banning children’s access to a public, clothing-optional 
park,21 a state university’s decision to strip a fraternity, where illegal drugs were 
abused, of its status as a recognized student organization,22 and, not least, a city ordi-
nance prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.23  The logic of the 
Dale opinion made the claimants’ arguments colorable in all these cases, but the lower 
courts were unwilling to follow that opinion’s logic to its conclusions.  Only four re-
ported cases follow Dale to uphold a claim of freedom of association.24  The Boy 
Scouts themselves are a party in two of these, one of which carves out a category of 
“nonexpressive” jobs in the Scouting organization, to which Dale does not apply.25  
Another involves a males-only meeting conducted by the Nation of Islam, and thus 
raises questions of the autonomy of religious groups that are different from those pre-
sented by ordinary association claims.26  Only one decision, released as this article was 
going to press, upholds a Dale claim by a nonreligious association other than the Boy 
Scouts.  It invalidates a statute denying funding to colleges that prohibited on-campus 
military recruiting.27  This case is the one exception to a general tendency, in the fed-
eral courts, to confine Dale to its facts. 
III 
THE NEOLIBERTARIAN REMEDY 
The Court’s opinion is mud, but a number of notable scholars have advocated that 
it be read to stand for a clear rule: noncommercial associations have an absolute right 
to exclude anyone they like.  This section will survey the arguments that have been 
 
 18. Recreational Developments of Phoenix, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (D. Ariz. 2002). 
 19. Gun Owners’ Action League, Inc. v. Swift, 284 F.3d 198 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 20. City of Shoreline v. Club for Free Speech Rights, 36 P.3d 1058 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
 21. Cent. Texas Nudists v. County of Travis, No. 03-00-00024-CV, 2000 Tex. App. Lexis 8136 (Tex. Ct. 
App. Dec. 7, 2000). 
 22. Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 23. Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528 (W.D. Ky. 2001). 
 24. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 2004 WL 2698052 (3d Cir. 2004); Boy 
Scouts of Am. v. D.C. Comm’n On Human Rights, 809 A.2d 1192 (D.C. 2002); Donaldson v. Farrakhan, 762 
N.E. 2d 835 (Mass. 2002); Chicago Area Council of Boy Scouts of Am. v. City of Chicago, 748 N.E.2d 759 
(Ill. 1st Dist. 2001), appeal denied, 763 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. 2001). 
 25. Chicago Area Council, 748 N.E.2d at 759 (distinguishing nonexpressive positions).  The other case is 
Boy Scouts of Am. v. D.C. Comm’n on Human Rights, 809 A.2d 1192 (D.C. 2002).  But even the Scouts have 
gotten only limited mileage from Dale.  The City of Berkeley was not prevented from revoking the Scouts’ 
privilege of docking their boats rent-free in the city’s marina.  See Evans v. City of Berkeley, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
696 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), petition for review granted, 605 P.3d 402 (2003). 
 26. Donaldson, 762 N.E.2d 835.  The internal autonomy of religious groups is a well-established doctrine 
that has been held to survive the holding of Employment Division of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), that (as 
a general matter) the Free Exercise Clause does not authorize the courts to carve out exemptions to generally 
applicable laws when such laws burden religious activities.  See Combs v. Cent. Texas Annual Conf. of the 
United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Catholic 
Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 27. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 2004 WL 2698052 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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made by these neolibertarian scholars.  These arguments are modified versions of 
some old, widely discredited libertarian objections to antidiscrimination laws.  The 
neolibertarian move is to deploy the same old arguments, but to restrict their scope to 
apply only to noncommercial associations.  The challenge for the neolibertarians is to 
show that this modification rescues the arguments from the fatal flaws of their prede-
cessors. 
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Roberts first gave the commer-
cial/noncommercial distinction prominence.  O’Connor thought that “an association 
engaged exclusively in protected expression enjoys First Amendment protection of 
both the content of its message and the choice of its members,” while “there is only 
minimal constitutional protection of the freedom of commercial association.”28  
O’Connor would characterize an association as commercial “when, and only when, 
the association’s activities are not predominantly of the type protected by the First 
Amendment.”29  She used the Boy Scouts as an example of the importance of context: 
“Even the training of outdoor survival skills or participation in community service 
might become expressive when the activity is intended to develop good morals, rever-
ence, patriotism, and a desire for self-improvement.”30 
The Dale Court does not state O’Connor’s limiting principle in its opinion, but she 
provided the majority’s fifth vote and there is no reason to think that she has changed 
her mind since Roberts.31  On the other hand, the Court’s opinion stressed the expres-
sive (rather than the noncommercial) nature of the Scouts.  Daniel Farber observes 
that “the commercial or noncommercial character of an enterprise is only a rough 
proxy for its expressive nature.”32  O’Connor did not write separately in Dale, and it 
would be premature to conclude that the commercial/noncommercial distinction made 
in her Roberts concurrence of sixteen years earlier—a distinction which is not even 
mentioned in the Dale opinion—is now the law of the land.33 
Nonetheless, should it be? 
 
 28. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 at 633-34 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment). 
 29. Id. at 635. 
 30. Id. at 636. 
 31. David Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amendment, 66 MO. L. REV. 83, 127 (2001).  
During the oral argument in Dale, Justice O’Connor asked whether the case might be resolved by relying on the 
commercial/noncommercial distinction.  Respondent’s Oral Argument at 23, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, No. 
99-699, 2000 WL 489419, at *23 (Apr. 26, 2000). 
 32. Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive Associations and the First Amend-
ment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483, 1500 (2001).  Justice O’Connor has written that a commercial association is not 
protected even if it engages in expressive activity.  See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 639 (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment); New York State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 20 (1988) 
(O’Connor, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 33. But see Bernstein, supra note 31, at 126-27; David Bernstein, The Right of Expressive Association and 
Private Universities’ Racial Preferences and Speech Codes, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 619, 626 (2001).  
Bernstein is more cautious about the meaning of Dale in DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, YOU CAN’T SAY THAT!  THE 
GROWING THREAT TO CIVIL LIBERTIES FROM ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 104 (2003). 
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A. The Paleolibertarian Critique 
The libertarian objection to antidiscrimination laws is quite old.  Classic liber-
tariannism—call it “paleolibertarianism” to distinguish it from the neolibertarianism 
of the contemporary writers whom this paper addresses—takes two forms: deonto-
logical and consequentialist.  These rest on three argumentative strategies, which I 
will call “Rights,” “Optimism,” and “Distrust.” 
The Rights argument resembles Kantian deontology in that it insists on economic 
rights without depending on predictions about the workings of an unregulated econ-
omy.34  The argument claims that laws against discrimination are unjust regardless of 
what the consequences of discrimination might be.  It begins with the premise that law 
should not interfere with liberty except to prevent violations of rights.  Interferences 
for any reason other than the prevention of rights violations are themselves rights vio-
lations.  When A associates with B, but refuses to associate with C, that association 
does not violate any rights of C.  No one has a right to compel others to associate with 
her.  Therefore, A has a right not to associate with C.  It follows that the law violates 
A’s rights when it penalizes A for her refusal to associate with C.  When a state vio-
lates people’s rights, it fails to show them the respect to which they are entitled.35  
Many opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, notably presidential candidate Barry 
Goldwater, made arguments of this sort.36 
Theories of this kind are familiar in the liberal tradition, but they rest on a dubi-
ously atomistic conception of human life, with a remarkably constricted account of the 
human interests that the state can legitimately protect.37  A society could, on this ac-
count, have a permanent outcast population in a state of chronic economic misery, 
vulnerable to ruthless exploitation.38  The state would have no power to remedy this, 
even if the culture of prejudice that is maintained thereby is one that itself produces 
numerous rights violations.39  It is bizarre to think that respect for persons demands 
such person-destroying results.  Not only does this account fetishize a historically con-
tingent distribution of entitlements; it also misreads the history it fetishizes.  The idea 
that property entails an absolute right to discriminate is not embedded in the common 
law from time immemorial but is an artifact of the Jim Crow era.40  Kant, who is the 
wellspring of such rights-based arguments, was not himself so indifferent to consid-
 
 34. The linkage is clearest in ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). 
 35. For arguments of this sort, see AYN RAND, THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS: A NEW CONCEPT OF 
EGOISM 126-34 (1964); Michael Levin, Negative Liberty, 2 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 84, 98-100 (1984).  George 
Kateb approaches the position described in the text but shrinks from it without much explanation, conceding that 
businesses, at least, may legitimately be denied the right to discriminate.  George Kateb, The Value of Association, 
in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 35, 58 (Amy Gutmann ed. 1998). 
 36. See RICK PERLSTEIN, BEFORE THE STORM: BARRY GOLDWATER AND THE UNMAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSENSUS 363-64 (2001), id. at 462 (quoting Goldwater’s speech, co-authored by William 
Rehnquist, declaring that “the freedom to associate means the same thing as the freedom not to associate”). 
 37. See Charles Taylor, Atomism, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 2, 
187 (1985). 
 38. See THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 15-62 (1989). 
 39. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 43-47, 181-90 (1996). 
 40. Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1283, 1475 (1996). 
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erations of human welfare.41  As a constitutional argument, libertarianism also has the 
handicap of entailing the correctness of Lochner v. New York,42 case law that only a 
few academics are bold enough to want to resuscitate. 
Another strand of libertarian thought does attend to consequences.  It rests on two 
interdependent claims: (1) Government is not to be trusted (Distrust), and (2) an un-
regulated capitalist economy produces good results (Optimism).43  These claims are 
interdependent because the strength of each depends on that of the other.  Even a 
largely self-regulating economy might usefully be tinkered with by a sufficiently wise 
and trustworthy government.  Conversely, if an unregulated economy leads to disaster, 
even an incompetent and corrupt regulator may be better than no regulator at all. 
Both claims are exaggerated.  The idea that capitalist economies can regulate 
themselves may have been plausible in John Locke’s time, but it is hardly so today.44  
Unregulated markets do not distribute goods in a just way.45  Their capacity to satisfy 
people’s preferences is routinely hamstrung by monopolies, externalities, and other 
transaction costs.  They also produce aggregate effects that no one wants, such as vi-
cious cycles of boom and bust.  That is why libertarianism has been such a flop.  No 
unregulated economy exists in any modern industrial country.  And government has 
not proven to be all that untrustworthy.  After the judiciary stopped reading libertari-
anism into the Constitution in the 1930s, the American economy did not collapse, but 
instead relied on its economic output to win World War II and the Cold War.  Central 
management of the money supply has produced a marked softening of the business 
cycle.  Libertarians worry about regulators being captured by powerful interests, but 
much of modern regulation manages to pursue the public interest.46  The classic tales 
of wasteful overregulation that are repeatedly cited in the media have been proven 
apocryphal.47  As a general matter, Optimism and Distrust are both falsified by experi-
ence. 
They meet the same fate when they are applied to antidiscrimination law.  Richard 
Epstein has argued that consumer welfare would be maximized if a right to discrimi-
nate were allowed.48  Epstein’s optimism about the fate of minorities in unrestricted 
markets is supported neither by history nor by economic theory.49  And, once more, 
 
 41. See ALLEN D. ROSEN, KANT’S THEORY OF JUSTICE 173-208 (1993).  Nozick, the most prominent ex-
ponent of this type of libertarianism, eventually recanted.  See ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE 286-96 
(1989). 
 42. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 43. Both claims are prominent in, for example, FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); 
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, V. 2: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976). 
 44. See IAN SHAPIRO, THE EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS IN LIBERAL THEORY 80-203 (1986). 
 45. The classic argument is JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
 46. Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7 (2000). 
 47. See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE. L.J. 1981 (1998). 
 48. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
LAWS (1992).  That his basic philosophical orientation is utilitarian rather than rights-based is made clear in 
Richard Epstein, Standing Firm, on Forbidden Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 49. See Glenn C. Loury, Why Should We Care About Group Inequality?, 5 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 249, 253-
59 (1987), David Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Nu-
merical Standards, 79 GEO. L. J. 1619 (1991), Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don’t Stop Discrimination, 8 
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 22 (Spr. 1991).  The weaknesses of Epstein’s attack on antidiscrimination laws are can-
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the premise of Distrust is called into question by the success of antidiscrimination 
laws in dismantling discriminatory markets and opening economic opportunities to 
African-American citizens. 
There is, of course, a valid core to libertarianism.  Markets generate wealth better 
than any rival economic arrangement.  They are distributively just to the extent that 
they make the availability of resources to any person depend on the value of those re-
sources to others.50  Also, they necessarily preclude some kinds of centralized direc-
tion: “Freedom means that in some measure we entrust our fate to forces which we do 
not control. . . .”51  But these generalizations have important exceptions.  There is a big 
difference between being right most of the time and being right all of the time. 
B. The Neolibertarian Modification 
Neolibertarianism is a mutated form of a perennial type of conservative constitu-
tionalism, one which holds that government ought not to intervene in the private sec-
tor, either because to do so violates citizens’ rights, or because government cannot be 
trusted with such powers, or because the unregulated private sector is already the best 
of all possible worlds. 
The newest arguments for a right against antidiscrimination law modify the older 
libertarian view, which had no use for the commercial/noncommercial distinction, but 
continue to rely on some combination of Rights, Optimism, and Distrust. 
1. Rights 
The strongest Rights-based claims after Dale are those developed by Michael 
Stokes Paulsen.  He contends that the freedom of speech should be understood to in-
clude all exercises of freedom of association.  The First Amendment’s text “does not 
limit the freedom to those who speak alone,”52 and so must include the right of groups 
to choose the content of their messages.   
That logically entails a freedom of autonomous message formation and delivery by the group, 
including the right of the group to define itself—to define who will constitute the group that 
forms the message and the speakers who will express it on behalf of the group—and, finally, 
to exclude competing messages from being intermingled with the group’s chosen expres-
sion.53   
These activities are not themselves speech, but they are a necessary part of the process 
that produces speech, and so Paulsen infers that they should also be protected from 
 
vassed in detail in a symposium at 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1-277 (1994), and in Samuel Issacharoff, Contractual 
Liberties in Discriminatory Markets, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1219 (1992) (review of Forbidden Grounds). 
 50. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 65 (2000). 
 51. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, supra note 43, at 30. 
 52. Paulsen, supra note 9, at 1922.  For this he cites Akhil Amar’s historical work on the speech and as-
sembly clauses, but Amar’s scholarship does not help him.  The right of the people to assemble, Amar observes, 
“referred to formal gatherings of voters—who else could presume to instruct lawmakers?—rather than mere 
informal clumps of self-selected persons seeking to associate.”  AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 29 (1998).  It has no obvious implications for the freedom of nonpolitical 
groups to discriminate. 
 53. Paulsen, supra note 9, at 1922. 
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state interference.54  Government’s incompetence to regulate speech evidently entails 
its incompetence to regulate the precursors of speech, such as association. 
Paulsen is skeptical of the diminished protection accorded to commercial speech,55 
and he thinks the distinction particularly problematic in the expressive association 
cases: “Expressive associations can have substantial commercial aspects. . . . Con-
versely, commercial business enterprises can have substantial expressive dimen-
sions. . . .”56  Because Paulsen’s approach is so abstract, it offers little to anchor the 
commercial/noncommercial distinction.  He concedes that the distinction may have 
value because it “supplies an important, if imperfect, limiting principle that attempts 
to cabin government’s efforts to limit the freedom of expressive association.”57  But 
this implies that nothing of value would be lost if government’s power to regulate as-
sociations were not “cabined” to commercial associations but eliminated altogether. 
Paulsen’s argument might be understood to apply only to precursors of speech that 
are clearly tied to the production of a specific message.  But that would just give us 
the message-based approach of Roberts again, and Paulsen has bigger fish to fry.  If 
the thesis is not thus confined, it would entail the unconstitutionality of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which affected the precursors of speech by disrupting racist insti-
tutions and condemning racism as morally wrong.58  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 ap-
pears to have played a powerful role in changing racist social norms.59  Antidiscrimi-
nation law is not intelligible except as an effort to change such norms.60 
The trouble doesn’t stop with the Civil Rights Act.  All human conduct is a pre-
cursor of speech.  All government regulation affects the culture.  Thus, Paulsen’s the-
ory entails the correctness of Lochner as well.  Maximum hours laws affect attitudes 
toward both work and economic policy and thus have political consequences.  In that 
respect, such laws determine the speech that will occur.  This reasoning is anarchic in 
its implications.61  If government cannot be trusted to regulate any of the precursors of 
political criticism, then government cannot be trusted to regulate anything.62 
 
 54. For a similar argument, see Carpenter, supra note 2 at 1535-36 n.99. 
 55. Paulsen, supra note 9, at 1924. 
 56. Id. at 1927 n.49. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Elsewhere Paulsen acknowledges that “[f]ew these days would take seriously an employer’s argument 
that racially discriminatory employment practices are protected as ‘free speech’.”  Michael Stokes Paulsen, A 
Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on “Equal Ac-
cess” for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 675-766 (1996). 
 59. See Richard McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and 
Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1074-82 (1995). 
 60. ROBERT POST, ET AL., PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION 
LAW (2001); KOPPELMAN, supra note 39. 
 61. The potentially anarchic implication of a very broad reading of the First Amendment was noted long 
ago by Robert Bork.  See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 
1, 25-27 (1971).  I am not entirely confident of my interpretation of Paulsen, because in a few footnotes, he 
nearly takes it all back by suggesting that the appropriate test for a restriction on associational freedom is that of 
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)—a test that in practice has been even easier for the state to sat-
isfy than the Roberts test.  See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).  See Paulsen, supra note 
58, at 692-93 n.93; Paulsen, supra note 9, at 1936 n.86.  (On the Dale Court’s unpersuasive efforts to distin-
guish O’Brien, see Stephen Clark, Judicially Straight?  Boy Scouts v. Dale and the Missing Scalia Dissent, 76 
S. CAL. L. REV. 521, 571-73 (2003).)  If this is Paulsen’s view, then he should not be classed as one of the neo-
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A similarly broad reading of the First Amendment is implicit in the Dale opinion, 
as Richard Epstein has noted.63  Building on the Court’s holding that an association 
need only engage in expression in order to be protected, he observes that businesses 
are constantly engaged in expressive activity, and so the logic of Dale applies to them 
as well as to noneconomic entities.64 
The problem will be present in any Rights-based approach to freedom of associa-
tion that tries somehow to derive it from the abstract idea of freedom itself: The result-
ing theory will be so abstract that there will be no traction to support the eco-
nomic/noneconomic distinction, and so it will always collapse back into 
paleolibertarianism.  The only hope for maintaining the neolibertarian position, then, 
is some kind of consequentialist argument.  And, indeed, the most persuasive of the 
neolibertarians rely on some combination of Distrust and Optimism. 
Dale Carpenter’s theory of associational freedom is driven largely by Distrust.  He 
thoroughly catalogues the dangers of Roberts’s message-based approach, which re-
quires courts to scrutinize a group’s message to determine whether that message is 
impaired by the application of an antidiscrimination law.  Such an approach, he ar-
gues, is likely to systematically punish unpopular opinions, since any doubt about a 
group’s message will probably be resolved against such opinions.65  The message-
based approach underestimates the expressiveness of membership policies.66  It fails to 
notice that silence can itself be a kind of speech, as it was in the case of the Scouts.67  
It also fails to note the practical harm to an organization that can be brought about by 
compliance with an antidiscrimination law.68 
All the dangers that Carpenter enumerates are indeed presented by a message-
based approach.  On the other hand, the specific abuses that he worries about have not 
often manifested themselves.69  He worries that these dangers are particularly prob-
 
libertarians; but then it would be hard to understand how he can support the result in Dale, as he obviously 
does. 
 62. Frederick Schauer has made an analogous point: 
To distrust a decisionmaker is to adopt, usually sub silentio, a comparatively rosy view of the status 
quo. If one has a relatively positive view about where we are now, then one does not want to create 
new powers possibly producing significant negative changes. Conversely, however, if one is not 
thrilled with where we are now, a significant possibility that things could get better might be worth 
running a significant risk that things could get worse. After all, from some points of view, how much 
worse could they get? Stated another way, the view that process values are sufficiently important to 
justify tolerating some substantively suboptimal results is a view that presupposes that the process has 
served us moderately well. 
The Calculus of Distrust, 77 VA. L. REV. 653, 666 (1991).  I have cited this passage in the past with some skep-
ticism, see Koppelman, supra note 39, at 261, but there I was discussing content-based restrictions on speech, 
restrictions with a long history of abuse.  There is no such history here. 
 63. See Richard Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 119, 139-40 (2000).  Epstein concedes, however, that it would be “bold and foolhardy” to claim that 
current law goes so far.  Id. at 139. 
 64. See Id. 
 65. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 1517. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1542. 
 68. See id. 1542-63. 
 69. Carpenter does devote a long discussion to the history of state-sponsored suppression of expressive 
associations, id. at 1520-33, but all of the history he describes involves naked viewpoint discrimination, which 
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lematic for gay organizations, but he offers no historical instance in which the mes-
sage-based approach was used to such an organization’s detriment.70 
Carpenter offers the commercial/noncommercial distinction as a “compromise”71 
solution that avoids these dangers.  He observes that “holding a job is more important 
to most people than learning morals from a scoutmaster while tying a knot in front of 
a campfire.”72  Economic interests, protected by the application of antidiscrimination 
laws to employers and retail businesses, are indeed more important than the none-
conomic interests that would be served by the application of those laws to noncom-
mercial associations.  But it does not follow that noneconomic interests are not impor-
tant.  This compromise might sensibly be adopted by a legislature.  Indeed, it has been 
adopted by most state legislatures.  But it does not follow that those who reject this 
compromise are violating the Constitution. 
The same theme of distrust is clear in Richard Epstein’s critique of a message-
based approach, though he carries it to a different conclusion than Carpenter.  The 
Scouts’ policy of quietly discriminating against gays made it hard for them to estab-
lish their message in court, Epstein observes, but it is “the kind of studied compromise 
that a large and successful organization must make to stave off schism or disintegra-
tion.”73  The compromise is “more stable in practice than coherent in theory,”74 but if 
greater clarity is a prerequisite for protection, then “[t]he obvious incentive is for or-
ganizations to take extreme positions in order to avoid the heavy hand of state regula-
tion.”75  A similar concern is intimated in the Dale opinion: “The fact that the organi-
zation does not trumpet its views from the housetops . . . does not mean that its views 
receive no First Amendment protection.”76  This is a serious objection.  I shall defer 
consideration of it until after examining the pertinent state interests.77 
 
therefore would be unconstitutional even without any special doctrine protecting associational rights. 
Carpenter responds by noting the courts’ hamhanded treatment of the groups’ messages in Roberts and (in 
the lower courts) Dale.  “Even if there aren’t many examples yet I’m not sure this response is fair given that 
application of antidiscrimination laws to private, expressive organizations is itself a very recent development 
(perhaps the last two decades).  Give it time, I predict, and the abuses would multiply.”  Personal communica-
tion, Oct. 19, 2003.  But there is no such trend.  Most antidiscrimination laws have not been construed to apply 
to private nonexpressive organizations.  Even the New Jersey case is an outlier and might have been overruled 
by the legislature had the Court not intervened. 
 70. “Imagine, for example, putting the fate of a gay organization’s internal organizational rules in the 
hands of an elected judge in a state with an anti-gay sodomy law.”  Id. at 1549.  The prospect is scary, but it is 
noteworthy that it hasn’t happened yet.  There is a history of pervasive viewpoint-based discrimination against 
gays, see Andrew Koppelman, Why Gay Legal History Matters, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2035 (2000) (reviewing 
WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1999)), but it considera-
bly antedates Roberts. 
 71. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 1587. 
 72. Id. at 1585-86. 
 73. Epstein, supra note 63, at 128. 
 74. Id. at 129. 
 75. Id. at 131.  For similar arguments, see Carpenter, supra note 2, at 1547; Reply Brief for Petitioner at 4, 
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, No. 99-699, 2000 WL 432367 (Apr. 04, 2000). 
 76. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000). 
 77. See infra part V. 
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2. Optimism and Distrust 
We already noticed that the Optimism and Distrust arguments are interdependent.  
Even clumsy government intervention will be justified if the consequences of an un-
regulated market are worse.  Thus, it is not surprising that the Scouts’ own attorney 
relied primarily on Optimism to make his case. 
The Optimism strategy is stressed by Professor (now Judge) Michael McConnell, 
who argued the case for the Scouts in Dale.  McConnell’s brief claimed that private, 
noncommercial expressive associations have a right to choose their own members and 
an unqualified right to choose their leaders.78  He has expanded on the justification for 
this rule in his writings unrelated to the litigation: 
If every group is internally diverse and pluralistic, reflecting the population as a whole, every 
group will be the same. If groups are required to accept members and appoint leaders who do 
not share their distinctive beliefs, their distinctive voice will be silenced. If individuals with 
disfavored beliefs can be forced to participate in institutions designed to mold them in accor-
dance with the dictates of political correctness, the tapestry of pluralism will be seriously im-
paired. Genuine pluralism requires group difference, and maintenance of group difference re-
quires that groups have the freedom to exclude, as well as the freedom to dissent. Freedom of 
association is an essential structural principle in a liberal society.79 
What McConnell describes would indeed be a nightmare, but is it a real danger?  
Even New Jersey, when it applied its antidiscrimination laws to the Scouts, did not say 
that there could be no discrimination anywhere in the state, but only that the Scouts 
were large and unselective enough to be a public accommodation.  McConnell’s ob-
jection is like an argument against economic regulation that thunders about the evils 
of Leninism.  This distrust is coupled with the optimistic assumption that in an un-
regulated society, associations will conform to the maximum possible extent to the be-
liefs of citizens. 
The resemblance between McConnell’s argument and old arguments for laissez-
faire economics is clearest in an early article he coauthored with Judge Richard Pos-
ner.  The McConnell-Posner vision is one of “a constitutionally prescribed free market 
for religious belief.”80  Just as an economist assumes that absent distortions of compe-
tition, such as externalities, an unregulated market will allocate resources efficiently, 
so the theorist of religious freedom should assume that competition between religions 
is valuable. 
The use of a free-market bench-mark is important because it identifies ways in which gov-
ernment policy distorts (sometimes unintentionally) the pattern of economic activity, causing 
resources to flow from higher-valued to lower-valued uses. Similarly, the First Amendment 
can be understood as positing that the “market”—the realm of private choice—will reach the 
“best” religious results; or, more accurately, that the government has no authority to alter 
such results.81 
 
 78. Brief for Petitioner at 32, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, No. 99-699, 2000 WL 228616. (Feb. 28, 2000). 
 79. Michael W. McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 453, 466 (2000). 
 80. Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 60 (1989). 
 81. Id. at 14. 
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Government should be neutral toward religion in that it should “create neither incen-
tives nor disincentives to engage in religious activities.”82 
McConnell’s argument for freedom of association closely resembles his argument 
for freedom of religion.  In both cases, the analogy with the market is doing a lot of 
work.  His Dale brief argues that “controversial questions of personal morality, often 
involving religious conviction, are best tested and resolved within the private market-
place of ideas, and not as the subject of government-imposed orthodoxy.”83 
In his leading article on the religion clauses, McConnell proposes to read the First 
Amendment to “protect against government-induced uniformity in matters of relig-
ion.”84  The baseline for the question whether government is inhibiting or inducing re-
ligious practice, McConnell argues, should be “the hypothetical world in which indi-
viduals make decisions about religion on the basis of their own religious conscience, 
without the influence of government.”85  But this hypothetical world not only does not 
exist—it cannot be imagined.  Religious choices are always already made in a political 
context.86  In a world in which Christians are not permitted by the state to massacre 
Jews, it is inevitable that the meaning of Christianity will gradually shift, so that 
Christians no longer think that massacres of Jews are pleasing to God.  Legislation by 
its nature induces uniformity.  If government must play no role in the shaping of relig-
ion, then courts must invalidate the homicide statutes, which impair the formation and 
preservation of religions (such as that of the Aztecs) that value homicide.  Any action 
at all by government will have some effect on religion, so, absent anarchy, a world in 
which there is no effect whatsoever is neither attainable nor desirable. 
McConnell and Posner acknowledge this.87  The interpretation of neutrality that 
they advocate is one in which “effects of government action on religious practice must 
be minimized, and can be justified only on the basis of demonstrable and unavoidable 
relation to a public purpose unrelated to the religious effect.”88  Prevention of negative 
externalities would always satisfy this test; provision of public goods might or might 
not, depending on the weights of the burden on the minority and of the relative im-
pairment of the good; paternalism and enforcement of morality should never pass the 
test.89  Unlike McConnell’s approach to freedom of association, there is no talk of ab-
solute rights in this co-written work. 
To the extent this argument is persuasive, it is because a quasi-libertarian argu-
ment works unusually well in the area of religion.  Many people believe that there is a 
fundamental right to follow one’s religious convictions; there is ample evidence that 
government is incompetent to discern religious truth; and there is also much evidence 
 
 82. Id. at 11. 
 83. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 78, at 47. 
 84. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 194 (1992). 
 85. Id. at 169. 
 86. This argument was previously made more briefly in Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. 
REV. 87, 152 (2002), and is defended against objections in Andrew Koppelman, No Expressly Religious Ortho-
doxy: A Response to Steven D. Smith, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 729 (2003). 
 87. See McConnell and Posner, supra note 80, at 6-7. 
 88. Id. at 33. 
 89. Id. at 46-51. 
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that religion thrives under a nonestablishment rule.90  The Distrust consideration is 
particularly powerful here.  James Madison famously denounced the idea “that the 
Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious truth” as “an arrogant pretension 
falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages. . . .”91  But this incompe-
tence does not extend to all possible matters of cultural formation. 
One of the most powerful recent defenses of an absolute freedom of noncommer-
cial association is Nancy Rosenblum’s book, Membership and Morals.92  Rosenblum 
shows that even the most discriminatory and illiberal associations do not invariably 
damage liberal citizenship.  For the alienated loners who join such associations, the 
likely alternative to illiberal participation is not liberal participation, but even more 
antisocial behaviors such as crime and drug addiction.  Membership in illiberal groups 
may also strengthen some virtues of citizenship, such as hard work, economic self-
sufficiency, and cooperation.  Some memberships are also temporary and limited, and 
they coexist with other identities and memberships. 
Rosenblum’s evidence destroys the mechanistic assumption that liberal society is 
undermined by all illiberal prejudices and associations within it.  But to refute this 
claim is not to establish the opposite proposition, that such prejudices and associations 
never have antiliberal consequences severe enough to warrant legislative intervention.  
Epstein’s claim that competition among groups will provide a satisfactory remedy for 
any pattern of exclusion, Rosenblum thinks, “applies much more convincingly to vol-
untary associations than it does to employment.”93  In order to determine that, how-
ever, one would need to examine the evidence in favor of intervention in any particu-
lar case in order to determine both the benefit achieved thereby and the burden on 
association. 
A similar combination of Optimism and Distrust appears in John McGinnis’s de-
fense of Dale.  McGinnis thinks that Dale instantiates a general theme in the 
Rehnquist Court’s jurisprudence of promoting “decentralization and the private order-
ing of social norms.”94  The rule of Dale, he argues, prevents totalitarian domination 
of government over culture.  The abandonment of a message-based approach “allows 
private associations to exert subtle social pressures through relatively quiet judg-
ments.”95  Requiring a clear link between message and protection would create a 
world “where contentious political advocacy alone supplements the norms encouraged 
by the government.”96  And, once again, the market will fix any wrong that is done.  
“BSA’s policy decisions are subject to a self-correcting mechanism because they put 
 
 90. See Koppelman, Secular Purpose, supra note 86, at 110. 
 91. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in RELIGION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 65 (Michael W. McConnell et al., eds., 2002). 
 92. NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN 
AMERICA (1998). 
 93. Id. at 170. 
 94. John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social 
Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 489 (2002).  For a critique of McGinnis’s defense of the Rehnquist Court’s 
work, see Andrew Koppelman, How “Decentralization” Rationalizes Oligarchy: John McGinnis and the 
Rehnquist Court, 20 CONST. COMMENT 11 (2003). 
 95. McGinnis, supra note 94, at 533. 
 96. Id. at 534. 
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the organization at risk of losing members and civic respect.”97  This is often true of 
noneconomic associations, and it is also often true of economic associations.  Like 
Epstein and Paulsen, McGinnis thinks that the economic/noneconomic distinction may 
prove “unstable,”98 since so much of business is expressive.  It is hard to keep the 
logic of the argument from reaching the Civil Rights Act.  Since the neolibertarian ar-
gument rests on an analogy between associations and markets, it is no surprise that the 
argument applies as well to markets as it does to associations.99 
Like the arguments for laissez-faire economic policy, the Optimism argument for 
freedom of association overgeneralizes from what is often the case to a claim about 
what is always the case.  Regulation of markets is indeed unnecessary and counterpro-
ductive.  Except sometimes.  The neolibertarians claim that the “sometimes” does not 
happen all that often, but this is merely a hunch.  It is dangerous for such hunches to 
become the basis of judge-made law, particularly constitutional law that is immune to 
legislative reconsideration in light of experience.100 
Let us take a closer look at the “sometimes.” 
IV 
THE STATE INTEREST 
Why would the state ever want to regulate the membership policies of noncom-
mercial associations?  As William Marshall observes, “[t]he definitional questions of 
where a liberty interest begins and a state interest ends are often interrelated.”101  The 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Dale declares that “[t]he state interests embodied in New 
Jersey’s public accommodations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy 
Scouts’ rights to freedom of expressive association,”102 but, remarkably, it never says 
what these interests are.  The Boy Scouts question presents a useful case study of the 
relevant interests and therefore of the costs of a broad judicial protection of associa-
tions’ right to exclude.  Perhaps the costs are worth it.  But one cannot tell unless one 
knows what those costs are. 
Dale is the focus of this article because it was the case that provided the Court the 
strongest justification for an expanded freedom of association.  Indeed, given the un-
certainty of the opinion’s reach, perhaps all one can say with confidence about Dale is 
that the Court felt certain that the Scouts, at least, were entitled to expanded protec-
tion.  If the Court’s intuition turns out to be wrong, then the case for expanding the 
freedom of association into an absolute protection for noncommercial associations be-
comes weak indeed. 
 
 97. Id. at 535. 
 98. Id. at 538 n.268. 
 99. A similar defense of a broad freedom of association is offered in BERNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 97-110.  
Bernstein relies on McGinnis’s claims, see id. at 103, but is even vaguer than McGinnis about the precise scope 
of the freedom of association that he wants to defend. 
 100. See Ronald J. Allen, Constitutional Adjudication, the Demands of Knowledge, and Epistemological 
Modesty, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 436 (1993). 
 101. William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 68, 96 n.166 
(1986). 
 102. 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000). 
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There are two reasons for thinking that it was a mistake to extend such categorical 
protection to the Scouts.  First, even if the Scouts’ discrimination accurately reflects 
the preferences of its members, it nonetheless inflicts considerable harm on a large 
population of vulnerable children whose preferences are not adequately taken into ac-
count by the market for association.  Second, there is some reason to doubt whether 
the Scouts’ discriminatory policy really does reflect members’ preferences better than 
a regime in which states can prevent discrimination by the Scouts within their borders. 
 
A. Externalities and Distributive Injustices 
The clearest benefit of legal intervention against discrimination is that it will pre-
vent harm to the specific persons who are discriminated against.  The harm prevented 
may outweigh the harm caused by regulation to the person who is prevented from dis-
criminating.  The balance of harms is not determinable by a universal rule in either the 
economic or the noneconomic sphere.103  Discrimination has cultural as well as eco-
nomic externalities: a practice of exclusion that makes insiders very happy may none-
theless injure those who are made pariahs, both because outcast status is bad in itself 
and because such status is likely to lead to the violation of other rights.104 
As I noted earlier, unregulated markets often produce unjust distributions.  Eco-
nomics is notoriously indeterminate with respect to initial entitlements.  If these are 
unjust, then a free market will simply perpetuate the injustice: garbage in, garbage out.  
The same is true of unjustly stigmatized social status.  Absent the intervention of the 
civil rights legislation of the 1960s, America’s racism would almost certainly be 
worse than it is now.  In changing our culture, we have become a more just society.  
The fairness of the distribution of honor and dishonor matters, too.105 
In the Boy Scouts case, the most relevant externalities and distributive injustices 
concern gay children.  They were the group who most obviously would have benefited 
from the application of an antidiscrimination statute to the Scouts. 
The stigma against gay people in the United States is most profound among ado-
lescents.  A study of harassment in American high schools found that the most upset-
ting type of harassment was being called gay.106  One national survey of males aged 
15-19 found that 89% thought that the idea of homosexual sexual activity was “dis-
gusting,” and only 12% were sure that they could befriend an openly gay male.107  
Students are often conspicuously cruel to peers whom they perceive as gay.  Students 
 
 103. See Peter DeMarneffe, Rights, Reasons, and Freedom of Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
145 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998). 
 104. See generally Koppelman, supra note 39; Andrew Koppelman, On the Moral Foundations of Legal 
Expressivism, 60 MD. L. REV. 777 (2001). 
 105. See Will Kymlicka, Civil Society and Government: A Liberal-Egalitarian Perspective, in CIVIL 
SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT 79 (Nancy L. Rosenblum and Robert C. Post eds., 2002). 
 106. Alice McKee, American Association of University Women, Hostile Hallways: The AAUW Survey on 
Sexual Harassment in America’s Schools 20, 23 (1993). See also Deborah Brake, The Cruelest of the Gender 
Police: Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment and Anti-Gay Peer Harassment Under Title IX, 1 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 37 (1999). 
 107. William Marsiglio, Attitudes toward Homosexual Activity and Gays as Friends: A National Survey of 
Heterosexual 15- to 19-Year-Old Males, 30 J. SEX RES. 12 (1993). 
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thought to be gay are often publicly humiliated, threatened with harm, spit at, pushed, 
and physically attacked.  Adults in authority often do nothing at all about the harass-
ment, and sometimes they blame the victims.108 
Gay adolescents often are rejected, not only by their peers, but by their parents as 
well.109  This extreme rejection and isolation produces a disproportionately high inci-
dence of suicide attempts.110  One study found that suicide attempts were associated 
with “reliance on social support from people who rejected them because of their sex-
ual orientation . . . .”111  Gay youth have the option of keeping their sexuality secret 
from everyone, but this secrecy has psychic costs of its own.  The fear of discovery 
becomes an integral part of their lives, and the constant feeling of isolation often leads 
to clinical depression.112  Suicide attempts “occur[ ] most often before they acknowl-
edged or disclosed their sexual identities to others.”113 
Those prejudiced against gays regard them as, in some ways, even more polluting 
than racists regarded blacks.  Gays are traditionally entitled to no legitimized place at 
all in society.114  Martha Nussbaum observes that in the judge’s famous speech at 
Oscar Wilde’s sentencing for sodomy, one of the most prominent legal texts in the 
history of homosexuality, the judge “treats the prisoners as objects of disgust, vile 
contaminants who are not really people, and who therefore need not be addressed as if 
they were people.”115  From this it is not far to Heinrich Himmler’s speech to his SS 
generals, in which he explained that the medieval German practice of drowning gay 
men in bogs “was no punishment, merely the extermination of an abnormal life.  It 
had to be removed just as we [now] pull up stinging nettles, toss them on a heap, and 
 
 108. See Safe Schools Coalition of Washington State, They Don’t Even Know Me!  Understanding Anti-Gay 
Harassment and Violence in the Schools (1999), at http://www.safeschools-wa.org/theydontevenknowme.pdf.  
See also Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Educational Network, The 2003 National School Climate Survey, 
http://www.glsen.org/cgi-bin/iowa/all/news/record/1413.html; Human Rights Watch, Hatred in the Hallways: 
Discrimination and Violence Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Students in U.S. Public Schools, 
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/uslgbt/; Pride and Prejudice: Working With Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual 
Youth (Margaret Schneider ed., 1997). 
 109. Anthony R. D’Augelli, Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Development During Adolescence and Young 
Adulthood, in Textbook of Homosexuality and Mental Health 267, 275 (Robert P. Cabaj and Terry S. Stein 
eds., 1996). 
 110. One well-known study found that “gay youth are 2 to 3 times more likely to attempt suicide than other 
young people.  They may comprise up to 30 percent of completed youth suicides annually.”  Paul Gibson, Gay 
Male and Lesbian Youth Suicide, in 3 Report of the Secretary’s Task Force on Youth Suicide, U.S. Dept. of 
Health and Human Services 3-110 (1989).  Some recent studies have confirmed this finding, while others sug-
gest that the disparity exists but is far lower.  See Ritch C. Savin-Williams, Suicide Attempts Among Sexual-
Minority Youths: Population and Measurement Issues, 69 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 983 (2001). 
 111. D’Augelli, supra note 109, at 280. 
 112. See A. Damien Martin & Emery S. Hetrick, The Stigmatization of the Gay and Lesbian Adolescent, 15 
J. HOMOSEXUALITY 163 (1988).  “These youth suffer from chronic depression and are at high risk of attempt-
ing suicide when the pressure becomes too much to bear.  They may run away from home with no one under-
standing why.  A suicidal crisis may be precipitated by a minor event which serves as a ‘last straw’ to the youth.  
A low grade may confirm for the youth that life is a failure.  An unwitting homophobic remark by parents may 
be taken to mean that the youth is no longer loved by them.”  Gibson, supra note 110, at 3-120. 
 113. D’Augelli, supra note 109, at 280. 
 114. See Cheshire Calhoun, Sexuality Injustice, 9 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 241 (1995). 
 115. Martha C. Nussbaum, “Secret Sewers of Vice”: Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in THE PASSIONS OF 
LAW 46 (Susan A. Bandes ed. 1999). 
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burn them.”116  Such attitudes are a ubiquitous part of the experience of many gay 
people in the contemporary United States, taking forms that range from cold attitudes 
to violent attacks.117 
If the state is going to combat this prejudice, it cannot be unconcerned with the in-
stitutions that promulgate it.  Nan Hunter observes that when entities that generate 
norms represent themselves as open to the public, but then exclude some people on 
the basis of their identity, that exclusion becomes a marker of inferiority.118  Some of 
those entities in fact have enormous norm-generating power, and those norms power-
fully stigmatize those who are excluded.119 
The Boy Scouts of America is now the single largest entity in the United States 
that excludes gay people on the basis of their identity, and it justifies this exclusion on 
the basis of gays’ own purported moral failings.120  It is a statistical certainty that tens 
of thousands of the boys in the Scouts will grow up to be gay.121  We have already re-
viewed the devastating consequences when gay youth are forced to lie and hide their 
identities, which is precisely what the Scouts’ policy requires of the gay adolescents 
who discover their sexuality when they are already members.  Defenders of the Scouts 
emphasize the good that Scouting does and the valuable experiences and skills that 
members acquire.  But these very virtues can make the program poisonous for some.  
The pressure on gay teenagers to hide their sexual identity, and the sense that their se-
cret makes them intrinsically worthless, are more intense the more they already value 
and trust the adults who, they discover, reject and ostracize gay people.  After the 
Rhode Island Medical Society unanimously approved a resolution saying that the 
Scouts’ ban on gays would increase the risk of teen suicide, a spokesman for the 
Scouts responded that gay youths had other options: “[T]here are other organizations 
that these kids can be a member of.”122 
 
 116. Quoted in RICHARD MOHR, A MORE PERFECT UNION: WHY STRAIGHT AMERICA MUST STAND UP 
FOR GAY RIGHTS 69 (1994). 
 117. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 21-25 
(2002). 
 118. Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 
1634 (2001). 
 119. See Marshall, supra note 101, at 94-96. 
 120. Even the United States military no longer does this.  Rather, it justifies its policies on the basis of the 
anticipated hostile reactions of non-gay troops to the presence of gay soldiers.  See Andrew Koppelman, Gaze 
in the Military: A Response to Professor Woodruff, 64 UMKC L. REV. 179 (1995).  The Catholic Church con-
demns homosexual activity, but it does not hold that a person is morally defective and unclean merely because 
of homosexual desire.  Quite the contrary; “the particular inclination of the homosexual person is not a sin.”  
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Letter to Bishops on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons 
(Oct. 1, 1985), 32 THE POPE SPEAKS 62 (1987). 
 121. Between two and five percent of the male population is gay.  See RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 
294-95 (1992).  The 2000 Annual Report of the Boy Scouts of America reported a total membership of 
3,351,969.  Subsequent reports (reflecting, perhaps, negative publicity in the wake of Dale) do not state the total 
membership.  The 2001 Annual Report provides figures on Cub Scouts and Boy Scouts that add up to 
3,049,070, while the 2002 report’s total is 3,011,269 and the 2003 report’s total is 2,911,823.  See 
http://www.scouting.org.  It follows that the number of gay youth is somewhere between 60,000 and 152,000.  
There is some evidence that the percentage is even higher among adolescents.  See D’Augelli, supra note 109, 
at 267-68. 
 122. Matthew Schuerman, Dying to Be a Boy Scout?: Doctors Say the Boy Scout Ban Will Increase The 
Rate of Suicide Among Gay Youth, THE ADVOCATE, June 19, 2001, at 15. 
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The trouble, of course, is that a seven-year-old boy does not know whether he is 
gay when he decides to join the Cub Scouts.  James Dale, whose expulsion from the 
Scouts when he was a college student led to the Dale litigation, is an example.  He 
joined the organization when he was eight.  He wanted to join when he was even 
younger, since his older brother and his father were members.123  He was an enthusias-
tic Scout, rising to the rank of Eagle, the highest honor the Scouts could bestow. 
The Scouts revoked Dale’s membership after a newspaper story, which did not 
mention his affiliation with the Scouts, identified him as an officer of his college’s 
lesbian and gay student organization.  The Scouts claimed that Dale’s continued 
membership would contradict their moral teachings because he disagreed with those 
teachings.  But the Scouts’ decision to terminate Dale was not, and could not have 
been, based on his beliefs.  When they threw him out, they did not know anything 
about his beliefs.124  The Scouts also said that they believed that “homosexual conduct 
is inconsistent with the requirement in the Scout Oath that a Scout be morally straight 
and in the Scout Law that a Scout be clean in word and deed. . . .”125  But the Scouts 
did not know anything about Dale’s conduct, either.  They terminated him without 
making any effort to find out about either his beliefs or his behavior.126  The letter that 
 
 123. Chuck Sudetic, The Struggle for the Soul of the Boy Scouts, ROLLING STONE, July 6-20, 2000, at 101, 
105. 
 124. The relevant passage from the news article that was the basis of his expulsion reads: 
James Dale, 19, co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian Gay Alliance with Sharice Richard-
son, also 19, said he lived a double life while in high school, pretending to be straight while attending 
a military academy. 
  He remembers dating girls and even laughing at homophobic jokes while at school, only admit-
ting his homosexuality during his second year at Rutgers. 
  “I was looking for a role model, someone who was gay and accepting of me,” Dale said, adding 
he wasn’t just seeking sexual experiences, but a community that would take him in and provide him 
with a support network and friends. 
Seminar Addresses Needs of Homosexual Teens, THE STAR LEDGER, July 8, 1990, quoted in Boy Scouts of Am. 
v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 at 689-90 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 125. Position statement promulgated by the Boy Scouts in 1991, quoted in Dale, 530 U.S. at 652 (majority 
opinion). 
 126. The following representation during the Scouts’ oral argument in Dale thus is inconsistent with the 
stipulated facts: 
QUESTION: When you—I’m not sure what we’re talking about when we say exclusion of people 
who are not openly homosexual.  I mean, what if someone is homosexual in the sense of having a 
sexual orientation in that direction but does not engage in any homosexual conduct? 
MR. DAVIDSON: Well, if that person also were to take the view that the reason they didn’t engage 
in that conduct would it would be morally wrong— 
QUESTION: Right. 
MR. DAVIDSON: —and that’s the view that would be communicated to youth, that case has not 
come up, but it’s my understanding of the policy that that person would not be excluded. 
QUESTION: But somebody who was homosexual and celibate, but who said, in my view it isn’t 
morally wrong, would such a person be excluded? 
MR. DAVIDSON: Justice Ginsburg, I’m not sure I got the nots right in that question, but if some-
body said it was morally wrong, and that they didn’t engage in it but did have homosexual inclina-
tions, I believe that that person would be eligible for leadership, as I understand the policy. 
Official Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-7, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, April 26, 2000, 2000 WL 489419 (No. 
99-699).  “No BSA representatives spoke with Dale during the course of his expulsion, asked his views on 
sexuality or any topic, or questioned his approach to scoutmaster duties.”  Brief for Respondent at 7, Boy 
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (No. 99-699). 
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told him the reason for his expulsion stated simply that the Boy Scouts “specifically 
forbid membership to homosexuals.”127  They threw him out for being gay. 
“Boy Scouts was community,” Dale later explained.128  “It was a place where I felt 
I belonged.  I did other things. I was in soccer and basketball.  But nothing fit as well 
as the Boy Scouts.  I felt I didn’t have to be the best football player or run the fastest.  
In the Boy Scouts, I could be who I was.  They valued me for who I was.”129  When he 
was expelled, “it was like a kidney punch.  I felt betrayed.  This was the organization 
that taught me how to be me.”130 
Possibly, these harms do not rise to the level that justifies interference with the 
Scouts’ liberty.  That was the position of most legislatures before Dale.  The Scouts’ 
cultural power may not be enough to inflict serious harm on many boys.  Competition 
among youth groups and activities may ameliorate the harm of exclusion.  But these 
are fact-dependent questions, the answers to which are likely to vary from place to 
place.  They are not sensibly resolved by a uniform national rule emanating from the 
courts.  The prevention of this kind of mistreatment is not obviously beyond the le-
gitimate power of the state. 
B. The Free Market of Ideas and the Second Best 
Thus far, this analysis has assumed that an unregulated market reflects the prefer-
ences of consumers; that if the Scouts exclude gays, it is because that is what the 
members want.  The Scouts, however, have considerable market power that is rein-
forced by the Boy Scouts’ status as a kind of government-created monopoly. Conse-
quently it is far from clear that regulation must produce a decline in consumer satis-
faction.131 
The position in society of the Boy Scouts of America is not that of one small 
booth in the pluralist bazaar.  It is more like that of Anglicanism in England.  The 
BSA is enormous.  It is deeply intertwined with the state, to a degree unmatched by 
any other youth organization.  Its success in these respects is the result of its calcu-
lated decision to present itself as universalistic rather than particularistic.  It is pretty 
late in the day for the BSA to be presenting itself as one competitor among many. 
The BSA is the largest civic youth organization in the United States, and perhaps 
in the world.  More than eighty-seven million boys have belonged to BSA, and in 
1992 over a million adults were active members.132  Fifty percent of all American boys 
 
 127. Quoted in Dale, 530 U.S. at 643. 
 128. Sudetic, supra note 123, at 105. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  See also Clark, supra note 61, at 562-63 n.199. 
 131. The same point could be made about political parties.  A broad right of noncommercial association 
would not only hamstring antidiscrimination law, it would also render unconstitutional much of existing elec-
tion law, which pervasively regulates party primaries.  See Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties With Public 
Purposes: Political Parties, Associational Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274 
(2001). 
 132. See Dale 530 U.S. at 697 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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between the ages of seven and ten are Cub Scouts, and twenty percent between eleven 
and eighteen are Boy Scouts.133 
Since 1916, the BSA has held a Congressional charter.134  The BSA is exempted 
from a federal statute that bars civilians from wearing uniforms resembling those of 
the armed forces.135  Every President since Taft has served as BSA’s honorary presi-
dent.  Congress has authorized the military to loan equipment to the Scouts without 
charge, and to sell the BSA obsolete or surplus material.136  Every four years, the Na-
tional Jamboree, a huge camping festival that attracts tens of thousands of Scouts from 
all over the world, is hosted by Fort A.P. Hill in Virginia, a U.S. military base.137 
From the beginning the Scouts have emphasized their inclusiveness.  One histo-
rian of the BSA notes that an important asset of the organization was that it “adopted a 
point of view attuned to a democratically minded citizenry and opened its ranks freely 
to all creeds, races, and classes.”138  Official materials declare that “[n]either [our fed-
eral] charter nor the bylaws of the Boy Scouts of America permits the exclusion of 
any boy.”139  One typical publication urges representatives to give a “[p]ersonal invita-
tion to every boy in school to join scouting.”140  The Scouts are declared by their by-
laws to be “absolutely nonsectarian.”141  The Scouts have managed to identify them-
selves with the nation as a whole.  “Perhaps the BSA’s greatest image-building 
triumph was its appropriation of the symbols of American nationhood.”142  Bitter dif-
ferences of religion and ethnicity have been avoided.  The history of the Scouts with 
respect to race is less admirable, but even here the organization has become increas-
ingly inclusive, and it is well ahead of the rest of America.143 
 
 133. Brief for Respondent at 1, Dale (No. 99-699). 
 134. See 36 U.S.C.A. §§ 30901-30908 (2003). 
 135. DAVID I. MACLEOD, BUILDING CHARACTER IN THE AMERICAN BOY: THE BOY SCOUTS, YMCA, AND 
THEIR FORERUNNERS, 1870-1920 157 (1983); see 10 U.S.C.A. § 772(j)(1) (2003). 
 136. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 2554(a) (2002) (authorizing the loaning of equipment at Scout Jamborees); 10 
U.S.C.A. § 4682 (2003) (authorizing the sale of obsolete Army equipment); 10 U.S.C.A. § 7541 (2002) (author-
izing the sale or gift of Navy equipment); 10 U.S.C.A. § 9682 (2003) (authorizing the sale of obsolete Air Force 
equipment); 14 U.S.C.A. § 641 (2003) (authorizing the gift or sale of Coast Guard equipment to BSA or any 
public body or private, non-profit organization); see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 539f (2003) (waiver of rental fees in 
National Forest System not restricted to BSA). 
 137. Sudetic, supra note 123, at 109.  The support provided by the military is prodigious, involving the ac-
tive assistance of nearly 1500 uniformed members.  See Ken Perrote & Yvonne L. Smith, A.P. Hill Support 
Contributes to Success of Scout Jamboree, MDW News Service (Aug. 6, 2001) available at 
http://www.mdw.army.mil/content/anmviewer.asp?a=607&z=13. 
 138. HAROLD P. LEVY, BUILDING A POPULAR MOVEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS OF 
THE BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA 21 (1944). 
 139. Quoted in Brief for Respondent at 1, Dale (No. 99-699). 
 140. Id. at 2. 
 141. Id. at 3. 
 142. MACLEOD, supra note 135, at 178. 
 143. In its early days, the organization was as racist as the rest of American society.  “The first American 
Boy Scout handbook included Baden-Powell’s mnemonic device for ‘N’ in Morse code, a cartoon of a ‘Nimble 
Nig’ (the dot) chased by a crocodile (the dash).”  Id. at 212.  The BSA’s executive board decided that it would 
sanction no black troop without local council approval, and the southern whites’ veto was in constant use.  One 
board member answered a critic by noting that to admit black boys “would lose us many white Scouts. . . .”  Id.  
Where there was no established council, the organization simply refused to register blacks.  The Chief Scout 
Executive, James West, foresaw “great mischief . . . if we permit the organization of colored troops in some 
very small community, even with the consent of the superintendent of schools and other representative people.  
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Another early success was the monopolization of the term “Boy Scout.”  There 
were other organizations that used the term when the BSA was founded, but they were 
eclipsed by the success of BSA.  “[W]ithin its first year of life this organization suc-
ceeded in absorbing every other active boy scout group but one—the American Boy 
Scouts which, though a formidable competitor, also passed from existence before 
1920.”144  This triumph was abetted by the Congressional charter enacted in 1916, 
which gave the BSA the exclusive right to use the name of Boy Scouts.  This was 
promptly followed by successful legal action against the competitor organization, 
which was forced to change its name and did not survive.145 
After this long history of inclusiveness, the decision of the BSA leadership to 
plunge into the culture wars betrayed the expectations of much of the membership. 
Although the Boy Scouts are not an actual monopoly,146 they have enormous mar-
ket power.  The next largest youth organization, Camp Fire USA, has less than a quar-
ter of the Scouts’ membership.147  Membership in the Boy Scouts has a nationally un-
derstood meaning.  If you tell someone you are an Eagle Scout, no further explanation 
is necessary.  No other youth organization has such universal recognition or such 
enormous cultural resonance.148 
It is commonly said that those who disagree with the Scouts’ policies need not be 
members.  If an association is going to develop a coherent voice at all, its internal 
means of addressing dissent has to be respected by the law.149  Exit is a common 
method of dissent, and the characteristic means of control in free markets.  However, 
as the classic study of the exit option observes, when an organization provides a pub-
lic good, it is not really possible to exit.150  A young man can resign from the Scouts, 
but he must still live in a society in which the only boys’ organization with quasi-
official status publicly stands for the proposition that gay people are inherently defec-
tive and contaminating. 
Judge McConnell’s policy argument for freedom of association analogizes that 
freedom with freedom of religion.151  The analogy is problematic, because no religion 
 
Suppose this small community eventually becomes part of a county council or district council—it would work 
havoc and be an unnecessary embarrassment to overcome.”  Id. at 213.  In the North, there were black troops, 
but most troops were segregated.  In some cases, segregation was imposed by the leadership.  Id. at 213-14.  
Eventually, this policy was relaxed, and in the late 1920s and 1930s (a time when the nation as a whole exhib-
ited little concern about racial injustice) southern councils began to accept black troops, encouraged by a pro-
motion campaign undertaken by the national office.  “Stanley Harris, field executive for the South, estimated 
that by 1939, 50,000 of the nation’s 1,449,103 Boy Scouts were black.”  Id. at 214. 
 144. LEVY, supra note 138, at 19. 
 145. MACLEOD, supra note 135, at 156-57. 
 146. This is emphasized in Epstein, supra note 63, at 136-39. 
 147. The Boy Scouts of America has a total membership of approximately three million.  See supra note 
121.  Camp Fire USA reports a membership of 735,000, of whom half are girls and therefore are not eligible for 
membership in the BSA.  See http://www.campfire.org/all_about_us (last visited April 10, 2003). 
 148. The Girl Scouts come close, with 2.8 million girl members and 942,000 adult members; see 
http://www.girlscouts.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2002); but they obviously do not compete with the Boy 
Scouts. 
 149. See Steffen N. Johnson, Expressive Association and Organizational Autonomy, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1639 
(2001). 
 150. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 98-105 (1970). 
 151. Supra, part III B, 2. 
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in the United States represents an overwhelming majority of the pertinent population 
in the way that the Scouts do.  If we put some pressure on the analogy, we will see the 
important ways in which freedom of association is legally constrained, to the benefit 
of the BSA, even after Dale. 
In a regime of free association like that which has prevailed in the religion area, 
the Scouts would face a real possibility of schism over the homosexuality issue.152  In 
February 2001, the New York City board of the Scouts declared that the national or-
ganization’s ban on gays was “repugnant” and “stupid.”153  New York’s leadership 
later joined with those of Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Min-
neapolis, and Orange County, California, in proposing that the ban be discarded.154  
Yet none of these cities’ councils has officially rejected the national policy.  The na-
tional organization has too much leverage over them for them to do that.  Philadel-
phia’s council tried to adopt a nondiscrimination policy in May 2003, but quickly re-
versed itself after pressure from the national organization.155 
American churches have divided in the past over fundamental moral differences.  
When Northern and Southern churches disagreed about slavery, the Presbyterians, 
Methodists and Baptists each split into separate regional churches.156  Similarly, today 
there is a serious danger of division over the moral status of homosexual conduct 
among Presbyterians, Lutherans, Episcopalians, and Methodists.157 
 
 152. Nancy Rosenblum offers schism as the healthiest solution to the problem of discriminatory associa-
tions.  See ROSENBLUM, supra note 92, at 170-71. 
 153. The New York board acted, in part, in response to a threat by the New York City government to pro-
hibit its agencies from sponsoring Scout activities.  Eric Lipton, Local Scouting Board, Calling Gay Ban “Stu-
pid,” Urges End to Nat’l Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2001, at A21. 
 154. See Nine Scout Councils Request BSA National to Stop Discrimination Against Gays, 
http://www.scoutingforall.org/aaic/100101.shtml.  Thus far, however, this movement has not succeeded in get-
ting any modification of the national policy.  The organization responded by enacting a resolution reaffirming 
the gay exclusion and stating that there is no local option to the contrary.  Boy Scouts of America, BSA Board 
Affirms Traditional Leadership Standards, News Release (Feb. 2002) available at 
http://www.scouting.org/nav/enter.jsp?s=mc&c=fs (last visited April 7, 2003).  The reformers seem unlikely to 
succeed because conservative religious organizations are so strong within the BSA.  “[R]eligious bodies now 
sponsor 65 percent of all troops, compared with just over 40 percent 15 years ago.”  Benjamin Soskis, Big Tent: 
Saving the Boy Scouts from its Supporters, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 17, 2001 at 18.  Of these, two-thirds are spon-
sored by the Catholic Church, the United Methodist Church, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
(the Mormons), the Lutherans, and the National Council of Young Israel.  Brief of Amicus National Catholic 
Committee on Scouting et al. in Support of Petitioners at 1, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) 
(No. 99-699).  Of these, the Mormons “sponsor more Scout troops and packs than any other religious or civic 
group in the country.”  Lesley Stahl, The Boy Scouts: Policy of the Boy Scouts to Disallow Homosexuals Into 
Their Ranks, 60 Minutes, April 1, 2001, CBS News Transcripts.  The Mormons are less than two percent of the 
American population, but more than 12% of all Scouts and 23% of all Scout troops.  Sudetic, supra note 123, at 
105; Tracy Thompson, Scouting and the New Terrain, WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE, Aug. 2, 1998.  “Almost 
all of the church’s top leaders achieved the rank of Eagle Scout as young men, and Mormon elders use the Boy 
Scout program as an integral part of its youth ministry.”  Sudetic, supra note 123, at 109.  The Mormon leader-
ship has a remarkably retrograde view of homosexuality, one that sanctions even violent abuse of gay peo-
ple,and that appears not to follow in any apparent way from Mormon theology.  See Katherine Rosman, Mor-
mon Family Values, THE NATION, Feb. 25, 2002. 
 155. See Sara Rimer, Boy Scouts Under Fire: Ban on Gays Is at Issue, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2003, at A19. 
 156. See SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 659-65 (1972). 
 157. See David Van Biema, Out of the Fold?  The Debate over Gay Ordination and Same-Sex Unions Poses 
a Critical Choice for Mainline Protestants: Embrace or Schism?, TIME, July 3, 2000 at 48; Dave Condren, 
Presbyterian Church Faces Split over Same-Sex Unions, BUFFALO NEWS, March 12, 2001, at B1; Tom Heinen, 
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When these religious splits have occurred, the state has remained neutral.  After 
the rift over slavery, the respective factions on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line 
continued to call themselves Presbyterians, Methodists and Baptists, and to follow the 
rituals of their respective denominations.  Neither side attempted to enjoin these prac-
tices by the other.  More recently, the Society of St. Pius X is a group of Catholics 
who from 1988 to 2002 were in schism from the Church, their leaders excommuni-
cated by the Pope, because of their rejection of the Vatican II reforms.158  A number of 
churches of the Society operate in the United States, and it has hundreds of members 
here.159  During the schism, they celebrated the Catholic Mass using the priestly cloth-
ing and language traditionally associated with the church.  No effort was ever made by 
the Church to claim that these rituals and symbols were its intellectual property, or to 
legally enjoin the Society from operating as it did. 
The law of intellectual property does not compel this result.  Religious groups are 
protected as much as other groups from competitors with similar names, on principles 
analogous to those applied in trademark and trade name cases.160  Present law might 
well have authorized the Pope to enjoin Martin Luther from calling himself a “Chris-
tian.”  What has kept this rule from being a disaster for American religious pluralism 
is that few religious denominations have tried to enjoin each other from existing,161 
and nothing of this sort happened in the major divisions just noted. 
There is, however, every reason to think that the Boy Scouts of America would 
use the law to crush any schism within its ranks.  Any troop that separated from the 
BSA would have to give up its uniforms and its curriculum.162  It would have to alter 
itself in a fundamental way.  If it attempted to continue while disavowing the anti-gay 
policy, the BSA would presumably get an injunction to force it to stop identifying it-
self as a Boy Scout troop. 
 
Lutherans Address Same-Sex Unions, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 16, 2001, at 1B; Caryle Murphy, Confron-
tation Reveals Episcopal Split; Conservatives Attempt to Develop a Parallel, Supportive Church Hierarchy, 
WASH. POST, June 2, 2001, at B9; John Rivera, Deep and Difficult Differences Trouble Episcopalians in U.S., 
BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 4, 2001, at 1F; Bruce Nolan, Methodist Split Not Seen as Answer, Bishop Says, but 
Church Still Deeply Divided on Gay Issue, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 15, 2004.  There is also a 
danger of schism over the issue within the worldwide Anglican church.  See STEPHEN BATES, A CHURCH AT 
WAR: ANGLICANS AND HOMOSEXUALITY (2004). 
 158. See FATHERS OF THE HOLY CROSS SEMINARY, MOST-ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SOCIETY OF ST. 
PIUS X (1997); Associated Press, The World: Catholics Close a Historic Rift, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2002, at A7. 
 159. See John C. Ensslin, Sanctuary St. Isidore Parish Flowers Despite Rift With Catholic Church, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN NEWS, March 25, 2001, at 44A; see also http://www.sspx.org (listing statistics for the American 
District). 
 160. See generally Jed Michael Silversmith and Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, Between Heaven and Earth: 
The Interrelationship Between Intellectual Property Rights and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 
52 ALA. L. REV. 467 (2001); Howard J. Alperin, Annotation, Right of Charitable or Religious Association or 
Corporation to Protection Against Use of Same or Similar Name by Another, 37 A.L.R.3D 277 (1971). 
 161. There are, however, some significant religious groups that have used intellectual property rights to 
prevent schism.  See, e.g., Christian Science Bd. of Dirs. v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2001); General Conf. 
Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Perez, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Church of Scientology Int’l v. 
Elmira Mission of the Church of Scientology, 794 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 162. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Teal, 374 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. Pa. 1974), and cases cited therein (enjoining 
operation of “Havertown Sea Scouts”). 
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What the BSA leadership has after Dale is the best of both worlds: freedom of as-
sociation protects their right to discriminate, but their Congressional charter and intel-
lectual property law prevents dissenting factions, even those with tens of thousands of 
members, from splitting off.  If the religion analogy is accepted, then it should be 
pushed to its limits and the Scouts exposed to the dangers of schism that American re-
ligions routinely cope with.163  Of course, the Supreme Court, having decided to pro-
tect the Scouts in Dale, could not then order that their intellectual property protections 
be lifted.  It has no authority to do so.  But that is one more reason why these matters 
should have been left to the legislature, which has the flexibility to craft solutions of 
this kind. 
The present regime does not uniformly reflect the preferences of local associa-
tions.  The application of antidiscrimination law would be a great relief to some local 
councils, who after Dale are squeezed between their own gay-tolerant moral beliefs 
(and those of their donors and members) and the national policy.  The anti-gay policy 
has become a powerful obstacle to fundraising and the recruitment of volunteers in 
precisely those urban areas where the benefits of Scouting are most urgently needed.  
“There are probably a hundred positive things that scouting affords young people,” 
commented Lewis Greenblatt, president of the Chicago Area Council of the BSA.  
“This is one of the few negative things that is going on in scouting.  In Chicago, our 
core group is kids from the inner city.  Scouting offers them some extremely positive 
reinforcement that they don’t otherwise get.”  Chicago’s council has expressed its dis-
agreement with the national policy, but it is not openly repudiating it.  “We’ve gone 
about as far as we can go.  We’re right up to the line.”164 
The Chicago council would be greatly strengthened in its negotiations with na-
tional headquarters if the Council were constitutionally subject to the Chicago human 
rights ordinance.  It could tell headquarters that it had no choice but to comply, while 
telling locals forthrightly that it does not discriminate.165  Counsel could then do its lo-
cal work with the homosexuality issue firmly off the table.  The controversy over anti-
gay discrimination, which the Chicago council did not invite, would disappear.  The 
Dale decision has made it impossible to resolve the issue in this way. 
Dale is, then, at least to some extent, a defeat rather than a victory for pluralism.  
The pluralist argument depends on a simplistic, binary view of the constraints on as-
sociation, in which associations are either subject to state power or absolutely free to 
organize themselves as they see fit.  In fact, as the Chicago case shows, associations 
actually operate in a complex web of constraints, including the state, their umbrella 
 
 163. Yael Tamir argues that the proper remedy for exclusion from dominant associations is for the state to 
provide citizens with “a network of state-sponsored services that would lessen their dependency on the associa-
tions to which they belong.”  Yael Tamir, Revisiting the Civic Sphere, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 214, 232 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1998).  The regime that prevails after Dale is just the reverse of this: the quasi-official as-
sociation is precisely the one doing the discriminating, and of course the state provides no alternative. 
 164. Telephone interview with Lewis Greenblatt, President of Chicago Area Council of the BSA (Oct. 22, 
2002). 
 165. Chicago in fact had been attempting to enforce its human rights ordinance against the Scouts when the 
Dale decision was handed down.  See Chicago Council of Boy Scouts of Am. v. City of Chicago, 748 N.E.2d 
759 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001), appeal denied, 763 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. 2001). 
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organizations, and various groups of constituents, including donors, volunteers, and 
members.  Eliminating state control does not always increase a local association’s 
ability to reflect the preferences of its members.  In many of the nation’s largest cities, 
the opposite has been the case.166  Local scout troops are bullied by a distant bureauc-
racy; that bureaucracy just happens to be a non-state entity. 
The libertarianism of Dale is analogous to that of United States v. E.C. Knight 
Co.,167 which held that Congress had no power to regulate a trust that controlled 98% 
of the country’s sugar refining industry.  The Supreme Court’s disabling of govern-
ment power did not empower anybody except the monopolists who controlled the 
trust.  Similarly here, the Court’s constraint on public power produces a hypertrophy 
of private power.  Judge McConnell would read the religion clauses to “protect against 
government-induced uniformity in matters of religion,”168 and his argument for free-
dom of association suggests similar concerns.  Yet the Dale case has itself induced 
uniformity.  Had the case come out the other way, the result would be different in dif-
ferent states.  The Scouts might be forbidden to discriminate in Chicago except where 
individual troops invoke a right of intimate association,169 but it is most unlikely that 
the Scouts would be thus restricted in Salt Lake City.  This proliferation of options is 
one of the traditional strengths of federalism.170 
The problem in the Dale case thus resembles the problem described in what 
economists call the theory of the second best.171  The theory holds that when many 
markets are not competitive, it may be counter-efficient to attack monopolies in only 
some segments of the market.  Consumers may respond to the regulation by shifting to 
unregulated activities that are even more inefficient than the activities that regulation 
drove them away from, resulting in a net efficiency loss.  Here, if the Scouts possess a 
quasi-monopoly over a valuable cultural resource, freeing them from state regulation 
will not improve the market.  It may just produce still greater consumer dissatisfac-
tion.  If the first best solution of free association is not available, a message-based ap-
proach may be the second best. 
 
 166. See supra text accompanying note 154 (noting resistance to the policy from New York City, Chicago, 
Los Angeles, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Minneapolis, and Orange County, California). 
 167. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
 168. McConnell, supra note 84, at 194. 
 169. The Scouts’ Supreme Court brief emphasized that “[t]roops are incontrovertibly small, closely knit 
groups.”  Brief for Petitioner at 40, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).  It also cited the right of 
parents to direct the upbringing of their chidren.  See id. at 42-44.  These arguments were of no avail in 
Dale,because the intimate associations involved in scouting were not the entities that decided to do the dis-
criminating.  That decision originated in a distant headquarters in Texas, without the participation or even the 
knowledge of local groups.  But if the adult leaders of an individual troop wanted to exclude gays, they would 
have had a powerful claim. 
 170. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Framers’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 
1493-94 (1987). 
 171. The classic exposition is Kevin Lancaster & R.G. Lipsey, The General Theory of the Second Best, 24 
REV. OF ECON. STUD. 11 (1956). 
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V 
RULES OF LAW 
The argument just offered challenges the Optimistic story, but the Distrust prob-
lem has not yet been addressed.  Absent Optimism, though, Distrust lead us to a very 
different judicial rule than the one contemplated by the neolibertarians. 
Distrust was a pervasive theme in the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Employment 
Division v. Smith.172  In that case, the Court, largely consolidating a trend of the previ-
ous cases,173 held that the Free Exercise Clause does not authorize the courts to carve 
out exemptions to generally applicable laws when such laws burden religious activi-
ties.174  One reason why the Court declined to protect religious activities was that a 
different rule would require it to assess the burden that any law placed on religious ac-
tivities,175 which in turn would require it to scrutinize the beliefs of the religious.  
Scalia’s reservations about that procedure look a lot like Carpenter’s and Epstein’s 
reservations about a message-based approach to freedom of association: 
It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the “centrality” of religious beliefs before 
applying a “compelling interest” test in the free exercise field, than it would be for them to 
determine the “importance” of ideas before applying the “compelling interest” test in the free 
speech field. What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer’s 
assertion that a particular act is “central” to his personal faith? Judging the centrality of dif-
ferent religious practices is akin to the unacceptable “business of evaluating the relative mer-
its of differing religious claims.” . . . Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have 
warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion 
or the plausibility of a religious claim.176 
The rule that remains after Smith protects religion only against intentional inter-
ference motivated by animus against a specific religion.177  If one similarly distrusts 
judges’ ability fairly to discern and weigh the importance of associations’ messages, 
one might follow the reasoning of Smith by concluding that associations should have 
similar protection: only laws that deliberately burden them because of their viewpoint 
should be deemed to violate the First Amendment.178 
Before Dale, of course, the Court had a more protective rule than this: if it could 
be shown that a nondiscrimination law burdened an association’s ability to express its 
viewpoint, then the law would be invalid unless it was necessary to a compelling state 
interest.  The reason for the additional protection, as noted earlier, is that some asso-
ciations really are so closely associated with specific speech that the associations are 
practically inseparable from the speech.  But deciding whether this is so in any par-
ticular case depends on a fact-specific investigation, with all the dangers of subjectiv-
ity and balancing that repulsed the Court in Smith.179  The difference between the two 
 
 172. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 173. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitu-
tional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1277-82 (1994). 
 174. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79. 
 175. Id. at 886-87. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 178. The anomaly of Scalia’s providing the fifth vote in Dale is explored in detail in Clark, supra note 61. 
 179. This is noted by Carpenter, supra note 2, at 1539. 
03_KOPPELMAN_FMT.DOC 2/16/2005  9:32 AM 
Autumn 2004] AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE? 55 
cases is that in the case of religion, it is well settled that courts may not interpret reli-
gious doctrines.180  But this is entailed by the requirement that government not make 
pronouncements of religious truth,181 a requirement that is not relevant to most cases 
of freedom of association.182 
The message-based approach does have the effect of offering protection only to 
the most obviously prejudiced speakers.  Epstein’s question deserves an answer.  
“Why should the First Amendment protect only the extremes of the political distribu-
tion, but not the associational preferences of large, mainstream organizations?”183 
The answer is that social meanings are not innocuous.  Antidiscrimination law 
presumes, and experience amply shows, that patterns of discrimination and exclusion 
will perpetuate themselves absent legal intervention, and that this justifies such inter-
vention.  The law is intervening to try to change social meanings.  The message-based 
approach does put pressure on the culture to become less discriminatory, but it does so 
in a way respectful of speech, particularly the speech of those who most disagree with 
the government’s position. 
Jennifer Gerarda Brown argues that states should enact disclosure requirements 
that would require associations to disclose their discriminatory policies as the price for 
exemption from antidiscrimination laws.  Such requirements would ensure that people 
know the messages that they are associating with when they join, and so would facili-
tate more informed decisions to associate.184  Brown’s proposal is attractive, but she 
does not notice how close we now are to the regime she proposes.  The Dale litigation 
forced the Scouts to be open about their discriminatory policy and thus made salient 
an exclusion that had previously been tacit and thus normalized.185 
Antidiscrimination law does not defer to the market.  It skews its operation in just 
the way that a message-based approach skews the operation of associations.  Kimberly 
Yuracko has shown that the prohibition of sex discrimination in employment has iso-
lated exceptions.  Some of these derive from gender-based concerns of personal pri-
vacy: hospitals can discriminate in hiring nurses in maternity wards, and retirement 
homes can discriminate when they hire personal caregivers for their patients.  More 
interesting is the case of businesses that sell sexual titillation.  Strip clubs can dis-
criminate when they hire strippers, but businesses are not permitted to discriminate for 
the sake of “plus sex” marketing, which packages sexual titillation together with other 
products.  To take one well-known example, airlines may not discriminate on the basis 
 
 180. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 
696 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872). 
 181. See Koppelman, supra note 86, at 108-113. 
 182. This requirement is relevant to the autonomy of religious associations, which is why the Dale rule has 
been successfully invoked only by religious groups such as the Nation of Islam.  See supra note 24 and accom-
panying text.  The exemption of religious groups from antidiscrimination law is in this way not an exception to 
Smith but an application of its principles. 
 183. Epstein, supra note 63, at 130. 
 184. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Facilitating Boycotts of Discriminatory Organizations Through an In-
formed Association Statute, 87 MINN. L. REV. 481 (2002). 
 185. See Marc R. Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and the Politics of 
American Masculinity, 12 L. & SEXUALITY 271 (2003). 
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of sex in order to combine air travel with alluring flight attendants.186  Yuracko ex-
plains, “[W]hen deciding sexual-titillation cases, courts effectively do two things: (1) 
they rigidly divide the work world between sex and nonsex businesses, and (2) they 
police the boundaries between these categories to ensure that the nonsex world does 
not shrink, even though it may grow.”187  This rule makes sense, because the sexuali-
zation of the workplace “alters the way [women] are treated by others so that their in-
tellectual and professional attributes are simply less likely to be recognized and en-
couraged.”188  Such focus on the body also has a detrimental effect on the performance 
of the women themselves.189  Constricting the market makes people freer. 
Like plus-sex businesses, invisible-discrimination associations aren’t allowed to 
exist.  You can avoid the application of antidiscrimination law only by openly and no-
toriously discriminating.  But when you do that, you scare away some of the custom-
ers.  And this becomes a powerful incentive not to discriminate. 
Does this effect itself create First Amendment difficulties?  Is the state, under this 
rationale, suppressing speech in order to suppress its message?  Carpenter correctly 
observes that under a message-based approach, ambiguity is likely to be construed 
against associations that want to discriminate.190  More importantly, silence itself can 
sometimes be a message. 
Gay advocates understand that silence signals tacit disapproval of gay-rights claims, or at the 
very least embarrassment and shame about the subject. . . . [A]gainst the backdrop of loud, 
continuous, and insistent demands to discuss and take sides on gay-rights claims, a steadfast 
refusal to talk at all about the issue is hardly neutral.  It is itself a position, a “message.”  It is 
like the schoolchild who remains silent while students all around him recite the Pledge of Al-
legiance. . . . Preserving traditional sexual morality is the goal; silence is the method.  We 
may not like the goal or the method.  But if the First Amendment secures some space in 
which to develop one’s own identity, it surely guarantees enough to prevent the evolution of 
that identity in a direction the state demands.191 
But freedom of speech does not mean a right to engage in otherwise prohibited con-
duct in order to send a message, nor does it authorize one to disregard generally appli-
cable laws whenever compliance with them will be taken by onlookers to send a mes-
sage.192 
A law that precludes silent discrimination does not necessarily burden speech.  Si-
lence is not always a message.  At least some entities that discriminate are not think-
ing about sending any message at all.  An absolute right of noncommercial entities to 
associate, Marshall observes, “is overbroad because it protects discrimination wholly 
removed from the expressive goals of the organization.”193  So when the message-
based approach collides with the determined silence of the Scouts, the collision is less 
 
 186. See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 187. Kimberly Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 
92 CALIF. L. REV. 147, 196 (2004). 
 188. Id. at 205. 
 189. Id. At 205-09. 
 190. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 1542. 
 191. Id. at 1556-57, footnotes omitted. 
 192. See Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1826-35. 
 193. William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 68, 79 (1986). 
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like West Virginia v. Barnette194 than it is like Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence:195 the First Amendment does not bar application of a law that prohibits con-
duct that is not itself inherently communicative, even if the defendant engages in the 
conduct for communicative reasons, so long as the law does not define the prohibited 
conduct by reference to the viewpoint that is communicated. 
Does it matter that government’s purpose is to shape the culture?  But the law 
does this all the time.  When persons are forbidden to discriminate, this makes it more 
likely that they will develop less discriminatory attitudes.  When persons are forbid-
den to steal, this makes it more likely that they will develop greater respect for others’ 
property.  When any conduct is prohibited, preferences tend to adapt so that the con-
duct is no longer desired.  These effects are not unintended.  That they are intended, 
however, does not mean that the laws violate the First Amendment.  People’s prefer-
ences are inevitably shaped in nonrational ways by their environment, and law is part 
of that environment.  Typically, neither racists nor nonracists arrive at their positions 
through a process of rational deliberation.  Antidiscrimination law redirects these non-
rational processes in a way that ameliorates severe and pervasive harms.  As George 
Sher asks, “exactly what is disrespectful about taking (benign) advantage of a causal 
process that would occur anyhow?”196 
A message-based rule, in short, raises the cost of discrimination.  If you raise the 
cost of anything, you’ll get less of it.  This effect can already be seen in the aftermath 
of Dale, when the Scouts suffered a decline in their membership.  In the course of liti-
gation—and certainly once the case was over—the Scouts became so associated with 
discrimination against gays that they now almost certainly could satisfy the Roberts 
test.  Their fate is a warning to other groups.  Discrimination is not free.  Nor should it 
be. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Dale is a mess, but the upshot of the mess is that we still have the old message-
based rule of Roberts.  An association is more likely to win immunity from an antidis-
crimination law, the more clearly its message is a discriminatory one.  Dale is in some 
tension with this rule, but the opinion is so muddled that it establishes no new rule to 
displace the old one.  And this is not a bad place to end up. 
In the end, we have a choice of pathologies.  We can either live with the little pa-
thologies created by the message-based rule, or with the big pathologies that would be 
created by either of the large and clear rules—absolute protection for discrimination, 
or no freedom of association at all—between which it uneasily perches.  Ambiguity 
has its virtues.  There is this much to be said for the Court’s confused opinion in Dale: 
it has thickened the fog where clarity would be deadly. 
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